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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis to understand how stock market ratios affect net 
income  inequality.  The  study  of  how  finance  impacts  income  distribution  is  relevant  as  the 
income  distribution  of  a  nation  influences  savings  decisions,  resource  allocation,  innovation 
incentives and public policy and hence impacts the process of economic development. Using a 
cross-sectional data set of 68 countries and panel data set of 61 countries from 1975 to 2005, I 
apply cross-sectional OLS and panel regressions to look at how stock market size, liquidity, and 
activity impact income inequality. While stock market size is found to strongly impact income 
inequality in an inverse-U manner, weak evidence is found for stock market liquidity in reducing 
income  inequality.  No  strong  evidence  is  however  found  for  stock  market  activity  to  affect 
income inequality. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“For  one  thing,  it  (finance)  enriches  the  poor  more  than  any  other  system 
humanity ever has had,” - Sir John Marks Templeton. 
Not surprisingly, much work has  focused on the impact of financial development on 
economic development,  and of late, specifically on its  benefits  to  the  poor.  As Ross 
Levine (2004) explains, studying the link between finance and income distribution helps 
in  understanding  the  development  process  since  the  income  distribution  of  a  country 
affects resource allocation, innovation incentives, savings decisions and policy making. 
While the banking system of a country can indicate who gets access to credit and who 
does not, the evolution of equity markets can also be looked at to study how wealth shifts 
between different income groups. This paper tries to take a comprehensive look at how 
stock market size, liquidity and efficiency impact net income inequality across countries 
over  time.  A  bigger  stock  market  could  indicate  greater  financial  development  in  a 
country and thus, it is interesting to see how this affects income inequality over time. 
This paper tries to answer questions such as: Does a bigger stock market size result in a 
shift in income distributions? Does a more liquid and efficient stock market result in 
higher or lower income inequality? 
 
Financial development can impact income inequality through  its impact on economic 
growth, which is referred to as an indirect effect (discussed in detail in the literature 
review).  According  to  Ross  Levine  (2005),  financial  development  has  a  significant 
influence on economic growth through five channels:    2 
a)  Providing  ex-ante  information  on  the  best  investment  possibilities  and  capital   
allocation,               
b) Monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance,  
c) Enabling risk-sharing, diversification and risk-management, 
 d) Mobilizing savings into a common pool, and 
 e) Facilitating the transfer of goods and services. 
 
A natural  question which arises  is  how to  define a financial system  of a country.  Is 
financial development better represented by the banking sector of an economy or the 
stock and bond markets, or both? The dilemma highlighted above has been the subject of 
Ross  Levine’s  paper:  “Bank-Based  or  Market-Based  Financial  Systems:  Which  is 
Better?”  He  presents  three  alternative  theories:  the  bank-based,  market-based  and 
financial services view. 
   
“The  bank-based  view  highlights  the  positive  role  of  banks  in  mobilizing  capital, 
identifying good projects, monitoring managers, and managing risk” [Levine 1997]. The 
proponents of this view consider markets to be inefficient as they reveal information to 
the  public  too  soon  -  discouraging  individual  investors  from  finding  other  potential 
avenues for investment, and provide high liquidity - encouraging short-sightedness and 
impeding corporate control.  
 
On the other hand, “The market-based view highlights the positive role of markets in 
enhancing risk management, information dissemination, corporate control, and capital   3 
allocation” [Levine and Zervos, 1998].  A more liquid stock market enables investors to 
exit the market when they want and makes it an attractive investment avenue in the long 
term as well. This encourages firms to invest in long-term and more productive projects 
given  this  source  of  capital.  This  higher-productivity  capital  raises  return  on  the 
investment, encouraging more saving and more investment in physical capital, leading to 
faster  economic  growth  (Levine,  1997).  The  market  view  proponents  criticize  the 
efficiency of banking systems stating that if banks tie up with powerful and large firms, it 
could  hamper  growth  by  stifling  competition  and  preventing  effective  corporate 
governance.  
 
The financial services view rises above this conflict and recognizes the importance of 
both banks and markets as complements rather than substitutes. Instead, it looks at what 
is  important  to  aid  the  development  of  both  simultaneously,  and  hence  the  law  and 
finance view (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, henceforth LLSV, 1998) 
looks at legal systems being crucial in determining the development of banks and markets 
in a country. Levine’s paper finds that cross-country evidence does not support the bank-
based or market-based views specifically but confirms the complementarities of the two 
in the law and finance view.  
 
Rather  than  adding  to  the  large  literature  on  the  relationship  between  financial 
development and growth, this paper adds to the recent interest on how markets affect 
income inequality. Most of the literature on the impact of financial development and 
income  inequality  has  focused  on  the  bank-based  view  and  looked  at  how  banking   4 
development affects income inequality. This paper tries to break away from the norm by 
looking  instead  at  market-based  systems  and  how  income  inequality  is  affected.  The 
paper draws support from the view that it is not banks alone that determine financial 
development in a country. Thus, the paper’s focus is how stock markets impact income 
inequality across countries over time. This attempt seems even more relevant in an era 
where stock markets are increasingly becoming an important avenue for investment apart 
from  banks.  The impact on income inequality seems  relevant  in  current times where 
volatility  in  the  markets  could  significantly  shift  wealth  distributions  across  income 
groups. 
 
 This paper takes a comprehensive look at how stock market development proxied by size, 
liquidity and activity affect the level of net income inequality over time. I use a cross-
country data set and employ cross-sectional and panel techniques to do the same. The 
results indicate the presence of an inverse-U relationship between stock market size and 
income  inequality,  while  the  results  for  stock  market  liquidity  and  activity  are  not 
indicative  of  a  clear  relationship.  The  paper  also  accounts  for  a  measure  of  banking 
development and does not find it to be significant in regressions. The remainder of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature while section 3 
deals with the data. Section 4 explains the econometric specifications, section 5 presents 
the results and section 6 concludes the intent of the paper. 
 
   5 
2. Related Literature 
 
How does financial development impact inequality? It can do so through a direct and an 
indirect channel. The direct way in which financial development helps the poor is by 
allowing  them  access  to  credit  which  enables  investment  in  productive  avenues  and 
reduces their vulnerability to shocks. This is particularly important as it enables them 
access to better education and health facilities. Galor and Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and 
Newman (1993) build theoretical models where the lack of access to credit prevents the 
poor from investing in higher education or more productive activities. Moreover, credit-
market imperfections work to aggravate this problem resulting in wide income disparities 
and the entrepreneurial class being dominated by the wealthier sections while the wage 
earners are composed of the poor. They predict a linear inverse relationship between 
financial development and income inequality. However, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
tell a different story and predict a Kuznet’s curve between financial development and 
income inequality. In the early stages of financial progress, the income gaps widen as the 
rich grow richer and the poor remain crippled by the lack of access to credit. With time, 
during  later  stages  of  financial  development,  these  income  gaps  are  lowered  as  the 
barriers to financial access for the poor are slowly broken.  
 
The indirect channel is through the effect financial development plays on enhancing 
economic growth, as mentioned in the introduction. A lot of work has focused on this 
aspect and in particular, Beck and Levine (2002) have shown that both banks and stock 
markets have a positive impact on growth from a cross-country study, even after taking 
care of simultaneity and endogeneity issues. The issue of reverse-causality arises since   6 
economic growth is also known to impact financial development. Levine (1997) states 
that stock markets provide liquidity and the opportunity of trading risks while banks give 
important information about firms and management. Thus, both banks and stock markets 
aid economic growth and should not be considered in isolation. 
 
Atje  and  Jovanovic  (1993)  specifically  look  at  how  stock  markets  impact  economic 
development. To study how stock markets impact the growth rate of economic activity, 
they use the Greenwood-Jovanovic model, and to study the level effects of stock market 
development on economic growth, they rely on the Mankiw, Romer and Weil model 
(MRW, 1992). They find a substantial impact of stock markets on economic development, 
much more than the effect of bank lending. They conclude that it is surprising that stock 
markets  are  not  a  focus  in  many  countries  to  speed  up  the  process  of  economic 
development.  
 
Many empirical studies have tested the alternative theories regarding how finance affects 
inequality. The main focus has been in understanding how greater access to credit  –
measured by the issue of credit by banks and other financial institutions to the private 
sector – has impacted income inequality. Some of the studies include the paper by Clarke, 
Xu and Zou (2006) which tests for an inverse-U hypothesis in a cross-country study using 
OLS and random effects estimation. Although evidence of the inverse-U shape is not 
confirmed, the paper does conclude that greater financial intermediary development does 
work  to  reduce  income  inequality  over  time,  thus  supporting  a  linear  rather  than  a 
quadratic trend. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2007) take note of the direct and   7 
indirect effects that financial development play in affecting income distributions in that 
greater financial development aids efficient  capital allocation and promotes economic 
growth,  while  better  financial  access  removes  credit  constraints  for  the  poor,  thus 
lowering income inequality. They specifically look at how access to private credit affects 
changes in income distributions and how both absolute and relative poverty levels change 
and conclude that financial development  benefits  the poor over and above its  effects 
through economic growth, lending support to the direct effect. 
 
None of the above papers have tried to include stock market indicators to account for 
financial development. However, Zietz and Zhao (2008) look at the short run effect of the 
U.S. stock market boom in the 1980s and 1990s on income inequality. They also find a 
direct and indirect channel through which stock markets impact income inequality. The 
direct channel refers to cases when stock price appreciation increases capital gains to 
stockholders  or  if  dividends  go  up.  The  indirect  channel  refers  to  Tobin’s  Q-theory 
which ties stock prices to the real economy through investment. Stock price increases 
lead to greater investment, which in turn lead to higher production and employment. The 
paper distinguishes between stock holding and non-stock holding households and finds 
that stock market booms only have a temporary impact on raising income inequality in 
the U.S. and should not be used to target policy change. 
 
On a different note, in a recent paper by Favilukis (2008), it is observed that labor income 
inequality has been increasing over the last 25 years while equity returns have been high. 
This  has  been  accompanied  with  no  increase  in  consumption  inequality  and  only  a   8 
moderate increase in wealth inequality. Moreover, equity premiums have declined and 
stock market participation has been on the rise. He builds a general equilibrium model to 
show  that  all  these  trends  are  inter-linked.  The  reason  that  wealth  and  consumption 
inequality do not rise with increasing wage inequality is due to the fall in stock market 
participation  costs,  as  witnessed  by  the  rising  market  participation.  Thus,  the  fall  in 
participation costs and greater demand for equities have led to the decrease in equity 
premiums, greater market participation and subsequent lack of substantial increases in 
consumption and wealth inequality.  
 
Some studies have also tried to understand how the stock market affects specific income 
groups.  Das  and  Mohapatra  (2003)  have  looked  at  how  equity-market  liberalization 
impacted shifts in income distributions in a few countries and found that the gains from 
stock-market liberalization seem to be skewed to the upper quintile at the cost of the 
middle quintiles. They also found that the lowest income quintiles did not seem to be 
affected by the opening up of domestic stock markets. Sawhney and DiPietro (2006) look 
at stock market wealth proxied by stock market capitalization and its impact on the Gini 
coefficient, income share of the top and bottom quintiles and GDP per-capita. They do a 
cross-sectional study on 73 countries for the year 2000, and find that stock market wealth 
has  a  positive  impact  on  income  inequality.  In  particular,  a  higher  stock  market 
capitalization  ratio  raises  the  Gini  coefficient,  raises  the  income  share  to  the  upper 
quintile and lowers share to the bottom quintile. They do not look for evidence of a 
quadratic trend though.  
   9 
Bonfiglioli  (2005)  built  a  theoretical  model  on  the  relationship  between  investor 
protection,  financial  development  and  income  inequality  and  tested  the  model  using 
cross-sectional  and  panel  regressions.  The  paper  suggests  an  inverse-U  relationship 
between investor protection and income inequality. Greater investor protection is said to 
affect income distributions in two ways: by encouraging sharing of risks it lowers income 
inequality,  while  by  raising  returns  to  ability  and  increasing  the  number  of  people 
involved  in  risk-taking,  inequality  is  heightened.  Unlike  the  models  of  Banerjee  and 
Newman  (1993),  Galor  and  Zeira  (1993)  and  Greenwood  and  Jovanovic  (1990), 
Bonfiglioli does not consider income inequality to arise from differences in initial wealth 
and  credit-market  imperfections.  She  instead  looks  at  differences  in  entrepreneurial 
ability and how that translates into differences in income inequality. The model predicts 
that investor protection works to aid stock market development, and income inequality 
and stock-market size are related in an inverse- U manner and the only impact investor 
protection has on income inequality is through stock-market size.  
 
Bonfiglioli’s paper is also unique as it does not look at financial development as defined 
by the private sector’s access to external finance but looks at how equity-like financial 
instruments that besides helping in access to finance also encourage risk-taking and risk-
sharing. Bonfiglioli tests the predictions of the model empirically and focuses on the ratio 
of stock market capitalization over private credit to represent stock market development. 
Her results do confirm the inverse-U hypothesis between stock market development and 
income  inequality.  Thus,  the  paper  finds  that  equity-based  finance  works  to  raise 
inequality at first, while increasing credit to the private sector works to lower it.   10 
This paper differs from the rest in the literature by taking a comprehensive look at stock 
market indicators and how they impact income inequality. Unlike the existing literature, 
the focus is not on specific income groups or on a specific set of countries. The focus is 
not on a certain period or phase of transition in countries either.  This paper focuses on 
the market capitalization ratio – value of listed shares as a ratio to GDP – to represent 
stock market size and understand its impact on net income inequality. This paper also 
looks at how stock market liquidity and stock market efficiency affect income inequality. 
In  doing  so,  I  consider  quadratic  relationships  between  stock  market  indicators  and 
income inequality. I also address the question of whether the relationships remain when 
the banking development measure, as indicated by private credit ratio, is controlled for.  
 
I use three measures – turnover ratio, total value traded and market capitalization over 
GDP and look at how they work to affect income inequality as measured by the net Gini 
coefficients. Beckaert and Harvey (1997) and Levine and Zervos (1998) use the market 
capitalization as a ratio to GDP to indicate the size of the domestic equity market, a larger 
ratio indicating a bigger market relative to the size of the economy. Levine and Zervos 
(1998)  also  provide  support  for  the  relationship  between  stock  market  liquidity  and 
economic  growth  and  use  the  value  traded  ratio  and  the  turnover  ratio  (value 
traded/market capitalization) to signal stock market liquidity. 
 
 
 
   11 
3. Data 
 
The dataset includes one cross-section with data on 68 countries from 1975 to 2005. The 
panel  dataset  covers  61  countries  over  the  same  time-period.  The  main  dependent 
variable is the net Gini coefficient taken to represent net income inequality. I utilize the 
dataset used by Campante and Do (2007) who use estimates from the World Income 
Inequality  Database  (WIID)  version  2.0  published  by  the  UNU-World  Institute  of 
Development Research (WIDER). This dataset is comprehensive in the sense that details 
of whether the income or expenditure definition is used to define inequality, whether the 
methods of the underlying survey are correct etc are given clearly.  Campante and Do use 
only observations which are of highest quality or where the income concept or the survey 
methods are well-established. They collapse the dataset to include one observation for 
each country, year and type of data. They also find that the consumption based Gini 
coefficients are lesser than non-consumption based measures by 2.2 points, and hence I 
add 2.2 points to the consumption based Gini values to get equivalent net values. Also, 
the difference between gross and net income inequality is found to be 1.9 points and the 
subtraction of this value from gross measures gives the equivalent net coefficient. 
 
The main independent variables are stock market indicators to represent stock market 
development: Turnover ratio, value traded and market capitalization over GDP. 
 
Total value traded (TVT) is the ratio of the total value of trades of domestic equities on 
national stock exchanges to GDP. It measures trading activity relative to the size of the 
economy and can be used as a measure of stock market liquidity and activity. One caveat   12 
deserves mention here: stock prices can rise simply due to speculation and thus the value 
of stock trades could be priced upwards causing a hike in the TVT ratio, without any real 
drop in transaction costs or change in the actual number of transactions taking place. One 
method of controlling for this is to consider the market capitalization ratio which includes 
the price in the numerator as well, since any hike in stock prices will affect this ratio in a 
similar manner (Levine, 2003). Thus, if one finds a significant relationship between stock 
market liquidity and inequality even after controlling for market capitalization ratio, the 
price effect alone cannot be said to impact the relationship between the two.   
 
The market capitalization ratio (MCAP) is defined by the value of listed shares divided 
by GDP, and can be used as a measure of stock market size. The turnover ratio (TOR) 
measures the total value of trades of domestic shares to total value of listed shares, i.e.: 
TVT/MCAP. It can be used to indicate trading volumes relative to the size of the stock 
market, and can also be considered as a measure of liquidity. A small but active market 
implies a high TOR while a large but less active market results in a low TOR. TOR also 
does not suffer from the possible bias due to the price effect as mentioned before as the 
price enters both the numerator and denominator. All the three measures are taken from 
the 2006 updated version of the database by Beck et. al. (2000).  
 
The conditioning information set includes all the variables that are known in the literature 
to have an impact on income inequality. The simple controls include real GDP per capita 
and its square value to test for the Kuznet’s inverse-U hypothesis. The data is sourced 
from the World Bank’s WDI database. To account for human capital, the average years   13 
of secondary school attainment measure is taken from the Barro and Lee (2003) dataset. 
The  additional  controls  include  the  inflation  rate  to  account  for  macroeconomic 
fluctuations, the degree of openness captured by the ratio of sum of exports and imports 
over  GDP  (trade  ratio),  and  an  indicator  of  government  consumption  (government 
expenditure/GDP), all taken from the WDI database.
1 An additional control is a variable 
denoting ethno linguistic fractionalization from Alesina et al (2003). To control  for the 
level of banking development in a country, the ratio of private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial institutions to the GDP is included in some regressions. The 
private credit ratio is sourced from the Beck et al. database on financial structure (2006). 
The regional dummies are sourced from Campante and Do (2007). 
 
The measures of stock market development could be endogenous due to reverse causality 
in  that  the  level  of  income  inequality  could  also  affect  the  level  of  stock  market 
development.  Inequality affects financial development through the effect on unequal 
access  to  resources.  With  weak  institutions  in  place,  inequality  encourages  vested 
interests to monopolize and control the access to the financial system (Rajan and Zingales, 
2003; Perotti and Volpin 2007). In order to extract the exogenous component of stock  
market  development,  a  usual  procedure  is  to  use  instruments  and  conduct  2SLS 
regressions. In the search for appropriate instruments , the literature of La  Porta et. al 
(1998)  is insightful.  They  find that the legal system determines how well protected 
shareholders in a market are and in this respect, the legal origin of a country plays a 
crucial role. In fact, La Porta et al   (1997) show that countries with lesser investor 
                                                 
1Note: In the tables in the appendix, trade ratio refers to the measure of international openness while the 
value-traded ratio refers to the indicator of stock-market liquidity.   14 
protection and rights  have lesser developed debt  and equity markets. Thus,  the legal 
origin of  a country – whether it be French, British, Scandinavian or German– determines 
how enforcement mechanisms work in different countries and this in turn impacts the 
development of financial systems. Thus, these can act as appropriate instruments for the 
stock market indicators and are known to be certainly exogenous. These indicators are 
available from LLS (2006).   15 
4. Econometric Specifications 
 
 
4.1.  Cross-sectional regression 
 
The  cross-sectional  OLS  helps  to  understand  the  relationship  between  stock  market 
development and inequality across countries.
 2  Here, data is averaged across time from 
1975 to 2005 to give one observation per country. As Clarke, Xu and Zou (2006) state, 
the cross-sectional regressions could help understand the long-run effects between the 
variables  of  interest.  Following  Bonfiglioli  (2008),  we  use  the  following  equation  to 
specify the econometric model: 
 
( , ) ( , )
2
'
12 i(t-k,t) ( , ) G
i t k t i t k t i i t k t X smdev smdev     


 
        
 
i(t-k,t) G  stands for the average  net  gini  coefficient,  ( , ) i t k t X   is the vector of control 
variables, 
( , ) i t k t smdev

denotes the different measures of stock market development and 
i   is the error term. Subscripts i (t - k) indicate the average of a variable observed in 
country i in the period between t - k and t, i.e. between 1975 and 2005. The additional 
control variables include real GDP per capita and its square, the measure of schooling, 
trade ratio, government consumption as a ratio of GDP, the inflation rate and the index of 
ethno linguistic fractionalization. Private credit as a ratio to GDP is also included in some 
                                                 
2 If there is an issue of heteroskedasticity, GLS is known to be more efficient than OLS. However, the 
Breusch-Pagan LM tests did not show evidence of heteroskedasticity in the cross-section sample.   16 
regressions to control for banking development. The real GDP per capita and schooling 
values are the initial values. GDP per capita and its square are in log values to control the 
dominance of wealthier countries. 
 
To  control  for  the  possibility  of  reverse  causality  and  endogeneity  of  stock  market 
indicators, I use the legal origin variables as a set of instruments.  
 
4.2.  Panel regressions 
 
The equation used to specify the econometric model (Bonfiglioli, 2008) is as below: 
it
2
'
12 G i t it it it it X smdev smdev       



       
Here, the Gini coefficient and all independent regressors are averaged over 5-year periods 
(i.e. for each country i over the 5-year period t) to create 5 year panels between 1975 and 
2005. The averaging helps to smooth out the business cycle fluctuations present in the 
stock market data. The real GDP per capita and schooling measures are values taken at 
the  beginning  of  each  5-year  period. i  ,  t  and  it   are  the  country -specific,  time-
specific effects and error term respectively. The panel regressions help to account for the 
time-series nature of the data, as opposed to cross-sectional analysis.  
 
The  next  question  which  arises  is  how  to  conduct  the  panel  analysis.  While  the  fixed 
effects analysis captures the trends within each country across time, random effects could 
be more effective as they use both within and between -group variations.  As Clarke, Xu 
and Zou (2006) state in their paper, the problem with fixed effects is that adding country   17 
dummies eliminates the cross-sectional variation. However, the level of inequality which 
is of main interest varies a lot across countries, while it varies only modestly within 
countries across time.  Thus, the fixed effects estimator will fail to capture the cross-
sectional variation in inequality. They also point out that fixed effects estimation could 
aggravate issues related to measurement error.  They emphasize that income distribution 
is often subject to measurement errors which may be different in different time periods. 
Thus,  the  fixed  effects  estimator  might  result  in  capturing  very  little  variation  in 
inequality, while capturing a greater variation of measurement error.  
 
The  random  effects  estimator  however  has  a  strong  assumption  that  the  unobserved 
effects are uncorrelated with the regressors and follow the normal distribution. Under the 
assumption that there is no good reason to believe that the unobserved country effects 
should be correlated with the regressors, the random effects estimation would be more 
appropriate. Moreover, the random effects estimation allows for country-specific time-
invariant regressors, which is otherwise ignored in the fixed effects estimation. Thus, the 
random effects estimation allows for inclusion of ethno-linguistic fractionalization which 
is time-invariant. The random effects estimation was done using regional dummies to 
account for regional fixed effects. Time dummies were also used in some specifications.  
 
Although the arguments above seem to highlight the benefits of using random effects 
regressions, the fixed effects estimation was also conducted for robustness. Even if the 
random effects model is valid, fixed effects is always consistent. If the assumption that 
the  unobserved  effect  is  uncorrelated  with  the  regressors  is  violated,  random  effects   18 
estimates will be inconsistent. The fixed effects estimation relaxes this assumption as it 
allows for correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and regressors. In the fixed 
effects  regressions  in  this  paper,  the  estimations  include  country  fixed  effects  for  all 
specifications and time fixed effects in some specifications.   19 
5. Results 
5.1.  Cross-sectional Analysis 
 
Turnover Ratio: It is found to be negative and significant at the 5% significance level 
(column 1 of Table 3) and at the 10% level (column 2).  This result holds at the 5% level 
(column 3) even when private credit is used as a control variable, to account for banking 
development.  This  implies  that  a  more  liquid  stock  market  works  to  lower  income 
inequality.  No  evidence  is  found  for  a  quadratic  relationship.  (Refer  to  Table  3  in 
appendix) 
 
Value Traded  ratio:  It  is  found to  be insignificant  in  all specifications, even when a 
quadratic term is included. (Refer to Table 4 in appendix) 
 
Market Capitalization Ratio: It is found to be positive and significant at the 10% level in 
all specifications, with no evidence of a quadratic relationship. Thus, a unit increase in 
this  ratio  tends  to  increase  income  inequality  i.e.  stock  market  size  appears  to  raise 
income inequality. (Refer to Table 5 in appendix) 
 
Simultaneous effect of market cap ratio and value traded ratio: As mentioned earlier, to 
remove doubts that the effect of value traded ratio is being dominated by the price effect, 
we add market cap ratio as an additional regressor. Value traded ratio becomes negative 
and  significant  at  the  10%  level  (column  2  of  Table  6)  when  additional  controls, 
excluding banking development are added. The coefficient on market cap ratio is positive 
and significant in all specifications at the 1% (column 2 and 3 of Table 6) or 10% level   20 
(column  1).  No  evidence  is  found  for  quadratic  relationships.  (Refer  to  Table  6  in 
appendix) 
 
Other controls: In all the above specifications, GDP per capita and its square value are 
significant at the 1% level, and evidence is found for the Kuznet’s inverse-U hypothesis. 
As real GDP per capita increase, income inequality first increases but at later stages of 
development,  it  decreases.  Schooling  and  ethno  linguistic  fractionalization  are  also 
significant at the 1% level. While schooling works to lower inequality by an average of 2 
units, ethno linguistic fractionalization works to increase it by up to 15 units. The other 
controls appear to be insignificant, except for trade ratio which has a negative coefficient 
in the specifications which include market cap ratio as the main regressor.  
 
To  allow  for  endogeneity,  the  legal  origin  variables  were  used  as  instruments.  The 
Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions confirmed they were appropriate instruments.   
However,  the  Durbin-Wu-Hausman  tests  of  endogeneity  did  not  show  evidence  of 
endogeneity of the stock market indicators. Thus, there might not be an issue of reverse 
causality in this sample. 
 
5.2.  Results for Random Effects estimation  
 
Turnover ratio: Turnover ratio is negative and significant at the 5% (column 2 of Table 7) 
and 10% (column 1) significance level when time dummies, regional dummies and all 
control variables except private credit are included. Thus, higher market liquidity seems   21 
to  lower  income  inequality  except  when  banking  development  is  also  accounted  for. 
(Refer to Table 7 in appendix) 
 
Value Traded ratio: This ratio was found to be insignificant even at the 10% level for all 
specifications.  
 
Market  Cap  ratio:  This  ratio  was  found  to  be  strongly  significant  with  a  negative 
coefficient even when regional dummies and all controls were added. Unlike the OLS 
estimates, evidence was found for a quadratic relationship with the quadratic term being 
positive and significant at the 1% (columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 8) and 5% (columns 4,5 
and 6 of Table 8) level. Thus, the inverse-U hypothesis is validated in the random effects 
estimation.  A  bigger  stock  market  works  to  increase  inequality  at  first,  but  lowers 
inequality  after  a  certain  stage  of  stock  market  development.  (Refer  to  Table  8  in 
appendix) 
 
Value traded ratio and market cap ratio simultaneously: Value traded ratio and its square 
term  remain  insignificant  even  when  stock  market  size  is  controlled  for.  Market 
capitalization ratio and its square are significant even when year dummies are added. 
Thus, even after controlling for stock market liquidity, regional dummies, year effects 
and  banking  development,  evidence  is  found  for  the  inverse-U  relationship  between 
market size and income inequality. (Refer to Table 9 in appendix) 
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Other Controls: Real GDP per-capita and its square term are highly significant and the 
sign  of  the  coefficients  validate  the  Kuznets  inverse-U  hypothesis.  Ethno  linguistic 
fractionalization is also very significant and positive, indicating a negative impact on 
lowering inequality. The schooling measure has a negative coefficient and is significant 
in some specifications, thus confirming that an additional year of higher education lowers 
income inequality. None of the other controls seemed to show significance in the random 
effects estimation. 
 
5.3.  Results for Fixed Effects Estimation 
 
Turnover Ratio: Turnover ratio is insignificant in all the specifications, with and without 
time fixed effects. (Refer to Table 10 in appendix) 
 
Value  Traded  Ratio:  It  is  insignificant  in  all  specifications,  confirming  the  random 
effects estimation results. 
 
Market Cap Ratio: In the absence of year dummies, the linear coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 1% (column 1 and 2 of Table 10) or 5% (column 3) level. The quadratic 
term is negative and significant at the 1% level. When year effects are added however, 
only the quadratic term becomes significant maintaining the negative sign. Thus, even 
with fixed effects estimation, strong evidence is found for the quadratic term for market  
cap ratio. (Refer to Table 11 in appendix) 
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Value traded ratio and Market Cap ratio simultaneously:  When market size is controlled 
for, value traded ratio continues to be insignificant. In the absence of year effects, market 
cap ratio and its square term are significant and the inverse-U hypothesis is confirmed. In 
the presence of year effects, the linear term is significant only in the absence of private 
credit as a control. The quadratic term continues to be significant and has a positive value 
similar to the random effects estimation. (Refer to Table 12 in appendix) 
 
Other controls: None of the controls appear significant in any of the specifications. This 
is surprising especially for real GDP per capita and the schooling measure. Thus, this 
could be evidence for the concerns relating to measurement error being aggravated and 
variations to inequality not being captured in the fixed effects estimation. The impact of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization cannot be assessed as the fixed effects estimation drops 
out time invariant variables.  
 
5.4.  Summary 
 
Both the random and fixed effects estimations confirm the Kuznets hypothesis between 
stock market size and income inequality. A bigger stock market could be an indicator of 
greater financial development in a country and in this light, the hypothesis of Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) seems to have been proved. Unlike the studies which relied on 
banking development alone to account for financial progress and found a negative linear 
trend  between  private  credit  ratio  and  income  inequality,  the  use  of  stock  market 
capitalization ratio to indicate financial development validates the inverse-U hypothesis 
rather than a linear trend. As Favilukis (2008) explains, participation in equity markets   24 
entails  a  fixed  entry  cost  and  a  per-period  dollar  cost,  both  meant  to  capture  the 
informational and transactional costs. These costs are high in the beginning and it is the 
rich who almost entirely own stocks in the initial phases of stock-market development. 
However, over time these participation costs decline and the middle-income groups also 
start demanding a share in equity markets, lowering equity premiums and raising stock 
prices. Once the stock market reaches a certain size, the gains to the rich start declining 
because of lower equity premiums and due to greater participation by the middle-income 
groups, the gap between these income groups falls. Bonfiglioli (2008) also states that in 
the initial stages of stock market development, investors indulge in risk-taking more than 
risk-sharing and this drives income inequality upward. However, after the size of the 
market  for  risk-sharing  is  big  enough,  this  encourages  greater  risk-sharing  than  risk-
taking, thus lowering inequality as the stock market appears to be a safer investment 
avenue than before. 
 
The  results  for  stock-market  liquidity  and  efficiency  are  not  indicative  of  a  strong 
relationship  between these indicators and income inequality.  Although  Levine (1997) 
stresses that a more active and liquid market works to aid economic growth, the impact 
does not seem to trickle down to affect income inequality. As Das and Mohapatra (2003) 
observe in a set of liberalizing countries, higher value traded ratio aids the upper quintile 
and harms the middle-income groups, with no significant impact on the lowest quintile. 
They argue that greater equity market activity could indicate greater demand for equities 
leading  to  a  rise  in  stock  prices,  and  the  gains  from  stock  price  appreciation  would 
probably go entirely towards the rich who would dominate the stockholder group in the   25 
liberalizing markets. They also note that the coefficients on the upper quintile share and 
middle-income groups add up to zero, thus cancelling out the opposing effects on the 
whole. Thus, greater equity market activity does not seem to have any clear impact on net 
income inequality as a whole. In this paper, all regressions suggest that the value traded 
ratio has no significant impact on income inequality. 
 
The  result  for  turnover  ratio  is  not  very  strong  either.  Although  the  random  panel 
regressions suggest a negative linear relationship between this indicator and the net Gini 
coefficient, the value of the coefficient is not so large and is significant only at the 10% 
level. Moreover, the result is not robust to the addition of banking development measure. 
Further, the fixed effects regressions fail to show any statistically significant impact of 
this ratio on income inequality at the 10% level. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This  paper  looks  at  how  stock  market  size,  liquidity,  and  activity  impact  income 
inequality. In line with the theory that a bigger stock market and greater fund-raising 
through the equity markets works to increase income inequality at first, but lowers it once 
a certain size is reached, this paper finds a Kuznets inverse-U relationship between stock 
market size and income inequality. The liquidity measure as measured by value traded 
ratio  was  not  found  to  have  any  significant  impact  on  income  inequality.  A  higher 
turnover ratio, indicating a more efficient market, was found to lower inequality in both 
the OLS and random effects estimation although the magnitude of the impact was not 
very large. Moreover, this result did not hold in the fixed effects estimation. Thus, it is 
hard to  establish  a concrete inference on how stock market  liquidity impacts  income 
inequality. 
 
Further  research  could  be  done  with  a  larger  dataset  on  stock  market  indicators  and 
income inequality. Moreover, to account for potential endogeneity of all the regressors, 
one could experiment with dynamic panel techniques by including the lagged dependent 
variables as instruments. However, this requires at least 3 observations per country and 
calls for a richer dataset than available for this paper. A larger data set would also allow 
one to focus on specific income groups. 
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Appendix: Tables 1 - 12 
 
Table 1 and 2 report statistics for the cross-section sample where data is averaged from 
1975 to 2005, resulting in one observation per country. 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable        Obs         Mean     Std. Dev.        Min         Max
Gini 77 38.59997 9.439619 21.9656 59.1
Real GDP pc 77 6442.007 6706.388 140.2619 28205.71
Gov consumption 77 15.80461 5.269822 4.688637 30.89301
Inflation 77 1.583704 8.569938 0.01521 74.83683
Trade ratio 77 81.16883 56.98817 19.77148 411.6681
Market cap ratio 77 .4086682 .4764123 0.0054655 2.669513
Value traded ratio 77 0.2109824 0.3187053 0.000113 1.53161
Turnover ratio 77 .4181001  .4937082 0.011909 3.680838
Pvt credit 76 .5108535  .383629 0.0438786 1.48588
Schooling  68 6.250441 2.619488 0.61 11.43
ELF 75 .380124 .2364604 0.002 0.9302
TABLE 1
  
Note: ELF refers to ethno linguistic fractionalization. Value traded ratio is a measure of liquidity 
while the trade ratio refers to the measure of openness 
                                  
PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS 
(TVT- Total value traded ratio, TOR – Turnover ratio; P-values in parentheses) 
Variable gini    Mkt cap TVT TOR
Gini     1.0000
Market cap ratio -0.0228 1.0000
(0.8442)
Value traded ratio -0.1528 0.8173 1.0000
(0.1846) (0.0000)
Turnover ratio -0.3120 0.1200 0.3586 1.0000
(0.0057)  (0.2984)    (0.0014)
TABLE 2
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Variable  1 2 3
Turnover ratio  - 6.503**    - 4.348*   - 6.217**  
(2.55) (2.46) (3.07)
Log GDP pc 16.82***   19.68***   23.079***  
(6.224)    (5.376) (6.155)
Log GDP pc square  -1.0296**   -1.1037***  -1.386***  
        (.392) (.3538)  (.4172)  
Schooling  -2.299***  -2.3101*** -2.2075***  
(.4278) (.4363) (.4452) 
Government consumption -.23116      -.20669
(.2106)    (.220)  
Traderatio               -0.01598   -0.0249 
  (.0125)     (.0149)  
Inflation  -0.064     -0.0545
(.6445)     (.287)  
ELF 15.57***   14.66***  
(4.347)     (4.27)  
  Private credit  5.2518
(3.299)
No of obsvns 68           66           66  
Adjusted R-squared 0.4746  0.5656   0.5776 
TABLE 3: OLS estimation of impact of turnover ratio on net gini coefficient
 
Note: OLS refers to estimation by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively 
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 Variable    1 2 3
 Value traded ratio   2.596 1.594 - 0.6655
(3.207)  (3.617)   (4.555)  
Log GDP pc 22.22***    23.28***   23.745***  
(7.197)    (6.510)   (6.8116)  
Log GDP pc  square -1.448***  -1.3789***  -1.4260***  
(.4636) (.4427) (.4705)
Schooling -2.236***  -2.287***  -2.2446***  
(.4229)    (.429)     (.4300)
 Government consn   -0.2006  -0.2178
(.2082)   (.2143)  
Traderatio            -0.0173 -0.0189 
(.01332)   (.01374)  
Inflation -0.0607     -0.0546  
(.5636)   (.4169)  
 ELF 16.613***   16.769***  
(4.268)   (4.372)  
Pvt credit                     3.1609
(3.7108)  
 No of obsvns                                             68           66           66
 
 Adjusted R-squared  0.4403     0.5499   0.5468
TABLE 4: OLS estimation of impact of value traded ratio on net gini coefficient
 
 
Note: OLS refers to estimation by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively. Value traded 
ratio is a measure of liquidity while the trade ratio refers to the measure of openness 
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Variable     1 2 3
Market cap ratio 3.8187*    4.5215*    5.358*  
   (1.9286) (2.281) (2.988)
Log GDP pc 22.095***   25.842***     25.109***  
(6.8417) (6.066) (6.447)
Log GDP pc  square -1.4656***   -1.5976***  -1.538***  
(.4342)     (.4145)     (.443)  
Schooling -2.154***   -2.179***  -2.193***  
(.411)    (.4182)     (.4133)
 Government consn   -0.1518     -0.1478
(.2103)     (.209)  
Traderatio            -0.032**   -0.032*  
(.0154)    (.0159)  
Inflation  -0.059  -0.062
(.4113)   (.541)  
 ELF 15.419***     15.27***  
(4.169)     (4.283)
Pvt credit                      -1.8126 
(3.338)  
No of obsvns       68           66           66  
       
 Adjusted R-squared 0.4649      0 .579   0.573 
TABLE 5: OLS estimation of impact of market cap ratio on net gini coefficient
 
 
 
Note: OLS refers to estimation by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively 
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Variable 1 2 3
Market cap ratio 7.325*    9.354***  9.258***   
(4.345)   (3.154)   (3.347)  
Value traded ratio -6.929   - 9.3946*    -9.569 
(8.003)    (5.403)    (5.747)  
Log GDP pc 18.67***    21.343***  21.42***  
(6.875)  (6.003)   (6.164)  
 Log GDP pc, square -1.226***  -1.272***  -1.279***  
(.4398)   (.4075)   (.4194)  
Schooling -2.1369***  -2.1329***  -2.129***  
(.414)   (.4142)    (.4146)  
ELF 15.39***     15.428*** 
(4.116)     (4.2569)  
Govt Consumption -0.2143    -0.2163
(.2032)   (.2075)  
Traderatio -0.0351**   -0.0351**  
(.01718)    (.01735)  
Inflation -0.0586  -0.0578
(.4889)   (.4949)  
Private credit 0.4019
(3.477)  
No of obsvns  68           66           66 
       
Adjusted R-squared 0.4697   0.5954    0.588 
TABLE 6: OLS estimation of simultaneous impact of market cap and value 
traded ratios on net gini coefficient
 
 
 
 
Note: OLS refers to estimation by ordinary least squares. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively. Value traded 
ratio is a measure of liquidity while the trade ratio refers to the measure of openness.   36 
 
 
 Variable 1 2 3
Turnover ratio - 1.4685*   - 1.863**  - 1.2287 
( .8324)     (.8767)     (.9002) 
Log GDP pc 16.345**   16.163***  13.651**  
(7.621)   (6.028)     (6.819)
Log GDP pc square  -1.1249**  -1.014***  -.8718**  
        (.45981)   (.3753)      (.4146)
Schooling   -1.0756**  -.9593**  -.9425**  
(.4414) (.4626)     (.4372)  
Government consumption  -.1667   -.1217
(.1156) (.1205) 
Traderatio               -.0291  -.02704
  (.0178)     (.0167)
Inflation .00545    -.0688
(.1012) (.1098)  
ELF 18.275***  18.457***
(5.019)    (5.2616)
  Private credit  .25245 
(1.1635) 
       
Time dummies Yes           Yes            Yes
Regional dummies Yes           Yes            Yes
No of observations 182 173 164
TABLE 7: Random effects estimation of impact of turnover ratio on net 
Gini coefficient
 
 
Note: *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively, standard errors are 
clustered at country level and are represented in parentheses. There are six time dummies to 
account for the six 5-year time periods from 1980 to 2005. There are 8 regional dummies to 
account for regional fixed effects. 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market cap ratio 10.303***   10.309***   8.799***  5.229**    5.849**   5.719**  
 (2.374)    (2.588)      (2.599)    (2.520)   ( 2.411)   (2.507)
Market cap ratio, square - 4.3131***  - 4.527***  - 3.952***  - 2.672**  - 3.054**  - 2.928**  
(1.063)     (1.181)     (1.17)    (1.131 )    (1.189)    (1.179) 
Log GDP pc 18.312**     16.804***   13.752**   18.846**   17.99***  14.066**  
(7.109)      ( 6.102)      (6.279)    (8.018)     (6.243)  (7.035) 
Log GDP pc square -1.295***  -1.1068***  -.9434**  -1.291***  -1.1466***  -.9182**  
        (.431)     (.387)     (.3885)     (.480)      (.3806)     (.418)
Schooling  -.3958   -.3687  -.4642   -1.1736***  -1.026**  -.9935**  
(.390)     (.4089)    (.4012)    (.4448)     (.4461)     (.4321)  
Government consumption  -.1793 -.1598               -.1845  -.1444 
(.1283)     (.1287)                  (.1302)     (.131)  
Traderatio               -.0117    -.014                 -.0241  -.0215 
  (.0205)     (.0185)                   (.0223)    (.0206)  
Inflation  .0032   -.1165               .02517 -.0574
(.1063)   (.0987)                  (.0933)     (.1126)  
ELF 20.106***  19.454***               18.415***  18.375***  
(5.328)     (5.42)                 (4.947)  (5.17)  
  Private credit 1.434                              .3185 
(1.148)                               (1.16)  
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
No of obsvns 182           173           164           182           173           164  
TABLE 8: Random effects estimation of impact of mkt cap ratio on net Gini coefficient
 
 
Note: RE refers to random effects estimation, *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively, standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at 
country level. There are six time dummies to account for the six 5-year time periods from 1980 to 2005. There are 8 regional dummies to account for regional fixed 
effects   38 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market cap ratio 13.291***  13.935***   11.226***  5.455**   6.545***   8.506**  
(3.094)     (3.489)      (3.436)     (2.584)      (2.463)      (3.385) 
Market cap ratio, square - 5.565***  - 5.811***  - 4.866***  - 2.5297**  - 2.747**  - 3.767**  
(1.516)      (1.64)     (1.578)     (1.14)     (1.153)     (1.608)  
Value traded ratio -4.688   -5.690   -3.6579  -.699   -1.735 -4.6969
(3.462)   (3.62)     (3.573)     (1.623)     (1.749)   (3.386)  
Value traded ratio, square 2.657   2.779 1.871                 2.043
(1.706)     (1.697)     (1.702)                               (1.69)  
Log GDP pc 19.126***   16.34***  13.69**   18.096**   16.409***   12.27*  
(7.0454)     (6.109)    (6.45)     (7.91)    (6.271)     (7.331) 
Log GDP pc square -1.347***  -1.078***  -.934**  -1.2448***  -1.046***  -.8037*  
        (.4251)   (.3837)    (.3992)      (.4721)     (.3802)    (.4371)  
Schooling  -.3685 -.3617  -.460  -1.1642***  -1.009**    -.9618**  
(.389)   ( .4073)     (.3989)     (.4418)    (.4434)    (.4318) 
Government consumption -.2045    -.1799             -.1945   -.1635
(.1286)   (.1306)                  (.1273)     (.13168) 
Traderatio              -.0076  -.0108                 -.0256 -.01672
  (.0198)     (.0181)                  (.022)   (.0205)
Inflation .0411 -.0891 .0523 -.0125
(.1050)     (.1057)                  (.0925)    (.1219)
ELF 19.31***  19.068***           18.45***     18.119***  
(5.214)      (5.343)                   (4.961) (5.101)
  Private credit 1.1816 .0533
(1.216)                               (1.246)
Time dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of obsvns 182           173           164           182           173           164  
TABLE 9: RE estimation of simultaneous impact of value traded and market cap ratios on net Gini coefficient
 
 
Note: RE refers to random effects estimation, *** indicates 1%, ** 5% and * 10% significance levels respectively, standard errors are clustered at country level. There are 
six  time  dummies  to  account  for  the  six  5-year  time  periods  from  1980  to  2005.  There  are  8  regional  dummies  to  account  for  regional  fixed  effects  39 
Variable 1 2 3
Turnover ratio -1.176  -1.336 -.8037
(.773)    (.8022 )     (.858 )  
Log GDP pc 9.515 10.078 -.3819
(11.446)   (11.901)   (9.129)  
Log GDP pc  square -.7749 -0.829 -.2083
( .6745)    (.70188)    (.5650 )
Schooling -.5684 -.4603 -.4128
( .5195)    ( .566)    (.5381 ) 
 Government consn   -0.1493 -.01556
(0.118) (.1254)  
Traderatio            -0.0165 -.00378
(0.019) (.0179)  
Inflation 0.0647 -.0452
(0.077) (.1217 ) 
  Private credit 1.198
(1.148) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
  
No of obsvns 182 180 171
TABLE 10: Fixed effects estimation of impact of turnover ratio on net gini coefficient
 
 
 
 
 
Note: FE refers to fixed effects estimation; standard errors are robust standard errors (in 
parentheses). There are six time dummies to account for the six 5-year time periods from 1980 to 
2005  40 
  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market cap ratio 7.3119***  7.878***  6.505**   3.2321 3.7068 3.638
(2.453)    (2.582)    (2.593)     (2.831)     (2.923)    (3.061)
Market cap ratio, square - 3.521***  - 3.852***  - 3.324***  - 2.219*  - 2.576*   - 2.449*  
(1.055)    (1.076)   (1.079)   (1.31)    (1.301)   (1.243) 
Log GDP pc 8.03 7.453 -1.287 11.37 10.806 -1.1885
(10.29)     (11.11)    ( 8.041)    (12.9)   (13.821)     (10.373)  
Log GDP pc square -.6025 -.5900  -.1373  -.9326  -.929  -.2126
        (.6020)     (.6470)     (.4913)     (.7589)     (.8122)      (.6235) 
Schooling  .2431 .2002  .0722 -.5962 -.5474 -.4641
(.5014)        (.5414)     (.5442)     (.5275)     (.56704)    (.5545)
Government consumption -.0571  -.0284 -.1836 -.0782
(.1101)  (.1270)                  (.1135)    (.1234)  
Traderatio              .0094 .0127 -.0021 .0099
  (.0259)     (.022)                   (.0278)     (.0244)  
Inflation .04207 -.0769 .07675 -.0429
(.08846)   ( .1003)                  (.0775)     (.1186)  
  Private credit 1.937* 1.4359
(1.1215) (1.112)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
No of obsvns 182 173 164 182 173 164
TABLE 11: Fixed effects estimation of impact of mkt cap ratio on net gini coefficient
 
 
 
 
Note: FE refers to fixed effects estimation; standard errors are robust standard errors (in parentheses). There are six time dummies to 
account for the six 5-year time periods from 1980 to 2005. 
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Note: FE refers to fixed effects estimation; standard errors are robust standard errors. There are six time dummies to account for the six 5-year time periods from 1980 to 
2005 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market Cap ratio 7.595***   8.252***   6.854**   5.383 6.691*     6.3038
(2.505) (2.757) (2.762) (3.4985) (3.783) (3.945)
Market Cap ratio, square - 3.459***  - 3.803***  - 3.279***  - 2.935*  - 3.529**  - 3.34**  
(1.045) (1.054) (1.06) (1.702) (1.751) (1.65)
Value traded ratio -0.494 -0.546 -0.5087 -3.113 -4.319 -3.857
(1.442) (1.558) (1.379) (3.016) (3.276) (3.3047)
Log GDP per capita 7.287 6.586 -2.195 10.94 9.365 -2.74
(10.46) (11.37) (8.225) (13.07) (14.05) (10.789)
Log GDP per capita, square -0.548 -0.527 -0.0726 -0.8806 -0.807 -0.0818
     (0.6066) (0.658) (0.506) (0.764) (0.818) (0.651)
Schooling 0.236 0.1957 0.072 -0.4908 -0.4157 -0.3536
(0.496) (0.538) (0.541) (0.56) (0.615) (0.5911)
Govt. consumption -0.0615 -0.032 -.1916*   -0.092
(0.1105) (0.126) (0.114) (0.116)
Trade ratio 0.0086 0.0122 0.0032 0.0156
(0.0261) (0.0223) (0.029) (0.026)
Inflation 0.0468 -0.0708 0.1136 -0.0116
(0.0912) (0.1056) (0.0781) (0.1345)
Private Credit 1.9174 1.225
(1.146) (1.156)
Year dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes
No of observations 182 173           164           182           173           164  
TABLE 12: FE estimation of simultaneous impact of value traded and market cap ratio on net gini                                               